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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR:
PRIVATE POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC PRIMARIES, AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
Hugh D. Spitzer*
Abstract: Political parties always disliked the Progressive Era changes that pulled the entire
electorate into nominating candidates. Why, after all, should non-party members participate
in the affairs and choices of private organizations? Over the course of a century, Democrats,
Republicans, and minor parties repeatedly mounted lawsuits to attack new primary laws, and
they eventually prevailed on a key constitutional issue: the First Amendment right of
association. But when political actors access the courts for strategic purposes, they can get
caught in the vagaries of history and public attitudes, with outcomes they might not like. This
Essay focuses on the history of Washington State’s “direct primary” and “blanket primary”
systems, the repeated lawsuits challenging them, and the freedom of association doctrine that
propelled the blanket primary’s 2004 demise. It then recounts the blowback from
Washington voters, who enacted a “top two” primary system that sidelined the political
parties by sending the two highest vote-getters to the general election regardless of political
affiliation. It asserts that remaining aspects of Washington’s election system might violate
the State’s own constitution, and that things could get worse than ever for the parties, perhaps
disrupting precinct officer elections and even the state’s presidential primary. How did the
political parties wind up at odds with their own voters, with an outcome opposite to what
they intended? This Essay suggests that the answer lies in a web of conflicts: between
litigation and political strategies; between the federal and state constitutions; and between the
First Amendment’s protections of freedom of association, the late nineteenth century populist
constitutional ban on public assistance to private entities, and the early twentieth century
progressive goal of forcing private political parties to open their processes to the voting
public. It concludes that long-term litigation strategies to address political issues can fail to
achieve their objectives when those lawsuits overlook historical policy choices and ignore
popular sentiments entrenched in the national and state constitutions.

* Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author would like to thank Jeffrey T. Even for
his helpful comments on an earlier draft. While in private practice, the author advised Washington
State Governor Gary Locke in connection with the veto of legislation discussed in notes 81–83,
infra.
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Carefully designed political and litigation strategies can have
unintended consequences. Litigation decisions made for tactical and
philosophical reasons can unexpectedly crash into competing legal
doctrines, political paradigms, and historical forces, with unexpected
outcomes.
This Essay is about the unintended consequences of the American
political parties’ successful legal attack on the “blanket primary”
nominating system. The analysis focuses on Washington State, where
for more than a century, Democrats, Republicans, and minor parties
mounted lawsuits to dismantle Progressive Era nominations processes
on the grounds that parties are private associations protected by the
federal Constitution from governmental interference. The Washington
political parties were not alone in their efforts, which paralleled
developments in other states, most importantly in California. But in
Washington, the litigation strategy ultimately led to an outcome that was
worse from the parties’ standpoint: a wide-open “top two” primary
system that further diminished party importance. In addition, it appears
that evolving federal court rulings on the constitutionally protected
private character of political parties could easily lead to another
unforeseen consequence: a conflict with the Washington State
Constitution’s ban on gifts of public funds to private persons.1 Simply
put, courts hold that in the First Amendment context, political parties are
private organizations, so they are shielded from most types of
governmental interference in candidate nominations. However, in
Washington, this may produce an unintended result: using publicly
funded elections to choose party precinct committee officers, and
perhaps presidential primary slates, could violate the state constitution.
Political parties never liked Progressive Era changes to the candidate
nominating process that reduced party independence. They repeatedly
attacked the new primary laws in court over the course of a century,
initially without much success. The parties’ institutional stance never
changed, and as First Amendment freedom-of-association doctrines
evolved, the parties eventually prevailed on key constitutional issues.
Interestingly, these legal challenges put the political organizations at
odds with the voters whose support they sought—voters who doggedly
backed primary mechanisms that allowed them to choose whomever
they liked, regardless of party. This story highlights the tension between
federal constitutional doctrines and state-level policy choices, and
additionally, the tension between competing paradigms of political

1. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7.
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institutions and various major policy choices made by voters over time.
In Washington State, there is observable interplay between the First
Amendment’s protection for freedom of association, the late nineteenth
century populist constitutional ban on public assistance to private
entities, and the twentieth century progressive goal of forcing private
political parties to open their processes to the voting public.
Part I describes the rise and fall of Washington’s “direct primary” and
“blanket primary” systems, the repeated lawsuits challenging them, and
the freedom of association doctrines that propelled the blanket primary’s
2004 demise. It describes how Washington voters responded by enacting
a “top two” primary system that was eventually approved by the United
States Supreme Court. Part II focuses on the Washington State
Constitution, reviewing the populist prohibition on spending public
money for private purposes. Part III details how Washington statutes
provide private political parties with publicly funded processes to select
presidential candidates and to select precinct committee officers, the
lowest level political party officials. But this public funding for private
purposes might run afoul of Washington’s state constitution. Finally,
Part IV analyzes these phenomena in terms of conflicts between
different political philosophies and paradigms over time. These conflicts
manifest in evolving legal doctrines. The irony is that when political
actors access the courts for strategic purposes, they can get caught in
twists and turns of history that they had not foreseen, with results they
might not like.
I.

DIRECT, BLANKET, AND TOP TWO PRIMARIES, OH MY!

Nominating processes pick candidates, and voters choose elected
leaders from among those candidates. In a democracy, nominating
systems drive the final choices available to the public. The role of parties
in American nominating processes has evolved over time and among the
states, but that evolution has always reflected a tension between
competing interests of party activists, elected officials, and the general
electorate.2 Until the early twentieth century, political party nominations
in the United States were typically made by party members (and only by

2. MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SARAH M. MOREHOUSE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN
AMERICAN STATES 100–03 (4th ed. 2001).
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party members) in local, state, and national conventions.3 In the
Jacksonian Era, the use of nominating conventions was seen as a
democratic development encouraging broader participation in political
parties.4 But by the end of the nineteenth century, parties and their
nominating processes were widely viewed as undemocratic and under
the control of corrupt party bosses.5 The University of Chicago political
scientist Charles Merriam wrote in 1923 that “abuses of the delegate
system had produced widespread dissatisfaction and a general feeling
that the nominating conventions did not reasonably reflect the will of the
party.”6 The progressives “viewed parties . . . as an impediment to
democracy.”7
Public dissatisfaction with closely held control of candidacies led to
political revolution with the widespread adoption of the “direct
primary.” In direct primaries, voters (typically voters identifying with a
specific party) themselves nominated the candidates who would then
stand for office in a general election. By 1923, at least forty-five states
had adopted the direct primary system.8 In the words of the progressive
Republican Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, the “direct primary
is simply a method by which the will of the people can be ascertained in
the selection of those who shall make and administer the laws under
which all of the people must live.”9 The rapid adoption of direct
primaries in the early twentieth century reflected the progressive
movement’s emphasis on installing an honest and transparent
government, strengthening democratic institutions, and reducing the
power of both the traditional party leadership and industrial and other
special interest groups.10 For example, in Washington State,
3. Kaori Shoji, Primaries, State and Local Elections, in 2 KENNETH F. WARREN, ENCYCLOPEDIA
U.S. CAMPAIGNS, ELECTIONS, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 671–72 (Kenneth F. Warren ed.,
2008).
4. THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 14 (Michael Kazin et al.
eds., 2010).
5. R. Laurence Moore, Directions of Thought in Progressive America, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
35, 48 (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974); ERNST CHRISTOPHER MEYER, NOMINATING SYSTEMS: DIRECT
PRIMARIES VERSUS CONVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (1902).
6. Charles S. Merriam, Nominating Systems, in THE ANNALS: THE DIRECT PRIMARY 1 (Clyde L.
King ed., 1923).
7. Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of
Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 785 (2000).
8. Charles Kettleborough, Direct Primaries, in THE ANNALS, supra note 6, at 11.
9. George W. Norris, Why I Believe in the Direct Primary, in THE ANNALS, supra note 6, at 22.
10. WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 74–76 (1st ed. 1970). One study reviews the debate among political scientists on the
extent of anti-party sentiment in causing the shift to direct primaries in the early twentieth century.
OF
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progressivism also brought the initiative, referendum, and recall—
constitutional changes meant to reinforce the democratic power of the
people at large.11 Other reforms were brought about by a coalition of
Washington State progressives from both major parties.12 These included
nonpartisan judicial elections in 1907–09,13 women’s suffrage in 1910,14
workers’ compensation in 1911,15 and approval of a federal
constitutional amendment establishing popular election of U.S. Senators
in 1913.16
States enacting primaries in the early twentieth century differed in
their approaches. Some jurisdictions opted for “open primaries,” in
which most voters could participate regardless of formal party
membership, while other primaries were “closed,” requiring party
registration or even membership in a political party club.17 For the better
Based on empirical data, that study concludes that Merriam’s contemporary depiction of that
phenomenon appears to have been accurate. See Eric Lawrence, Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler,
The Adoption of Direct Primaries in the United States, 19 PARTY POL. 3, 15 (2011). Whatever the
origins of the direct primary, the impacts were significant, opening up new opportunities for
aspiring candidates and groups within the political parties. See V.O. Key, The Direct Primary and
Party Structure: A Study of State Legislative Nominations, 48 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 (1954).
General histories and background on America’s progressive movement are included in RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); NANCY COHEN, THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865-1914 (2002); and Moore, supra note 5.
11. See Claudius Johnson, The Adoption of the Initiative and Referendum in Washington, 35 PAC.
NW. Q. 296 (1944). In Washington State’s initiative system, a petition signed by 8% of the
registered voters may place proposed legislation directly on the ballot, or the proposed legislation
may be referred to the legislature either to enact that legislation or send it to the electorate with or
without an alternative. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a). With a referendum, the signatures of 4% of the
voters can force a statute passed by the legislature to be placed before the electorate. Id. § 1(b). The
recall permits a petition process to force a special election to oust any nonjudicial elected official
out of office mid-term. Id. art. I, § 33.
12. Although Washington’s politics was dominated by the Republican Party in the early twentieth
century, progressive legislators from both parties collaborated in enacting laws associated with the
progressive movement. William T. Kerr, Jr., The Progressives of Washington, 1910–12, 55 PAC.
NW. Q. 16, 18 (1964).
13. Nomination of Candidates for Public Office, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457. A general
discussion of progressive era legislation in Washington State can be found at Hugh Spitzer, Pivoting
to Progressivism: Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the Washington Supreme Court, and Change in
Early 20th Century Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric, 104 PAC. NW. Q. 107, 108 (2013).
14. Act of Feb. 25, 1909, ch. 18, 1909 Wash. Sess. Laws 26 (amending WASH. CONST. art. VI).
15. Act of Mar. 9, 1911, ch. 74, 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345.
16. H.R.J. Subst. Res. 1, 13th Leg., 1913 Wash. Sess. Laws 678.
17. See Charles Kettleborough, Digest of Primary Election Laws, in THE ANNALS, supra note 6,
at 181, 212–21. The open versus closed description is contained at 212–21. According to
Kettleborough’s chart comparing early twentieth century primary mechanisms, South Carolina
required membership in a political club to participate in that state’s primary election. Id. at 220. For
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part of two decades after statehood, Washington parties nominated
candidates by means of conventions.18 But in 1907, progressives in the
legislature gained passage of a bill establishing a direct primary system
for partisan candidates (other than President) and mandating that
political parties choose most nominees by public primary.19 In that new
system, separate ballots were printed for each political party, and voters
could choose the primary ballot for either party. If challenged, voters
could be required to swear or affirm that they intended to affiliate with
and support their chosen parties in the general election.20 This
requirement that voters affiliate with the party in whose primary they
participated put the 1907 approach somewhat in line with a closed
primary, restricted to party supporters only,21 although voters were not
required to pre-register with a specific party as is the case with a true
“closed primary.”22 Interestingly, Washington Senator George Cotterill,
a strong progressive supporter of the direct primary,23 protested on the
Senate floor that requiring an “open declaration of party affiliation as the
price of participation in a direct primary election is absolutely unAmerican,” “bars the door against the independent voter,” and would
allow party machines to “remain supreme.”24 The electorate appears to
have been sympathetic to Cotterill’s views. A legislative attempt in 1921

a lively depiction of the historical tension between party regulars and the public, and between party
conventions and presidential primaries, see Jill Lepore, How to Steal an Election: The Crazy
History of Nominating Conventions, NEW YORKER, July 4, 2016, at 20.
18. History of Washington State Primary Systems, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/research/history-of-washington-state-primary-systems.aspx
[https://perma.cc/A5TM-AQB8]. An excellent summary of the history of Washington primary
elections from the perspective of a political scientist can be found in Kevin Pirche, Political Parties
in the Evergreen State, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: POLITICAL LIFE IN WASHINGTON
45, 46–52, (Cornell W. Clayton et al. eds., 2018).
19. History of Washington State Primary Systems, supra note 18; Nomination of Candidates for
Public Office, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457. Section 2 of that law exempted the election of
presidential electors from the direct primary process. For a description of the progressive or
“insurgent” movement within the 1907 legislature, see DON BRAZIER, HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE, 1854–1963, at 67–69 (2000).
20. Nomination of Candidates for Public Office, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457, 464.
21. Shoji, supra note 3, at 671.
22. Id.; see also History of the Blanket Primary in Washington, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/bp_history.aspx [https://perma.cc/X7KV-FYDR].
23. For Cotterill’s political stance and his own contested election, see DON BRAZIER, HISTORY OF
THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE, 1854–1963, at 68–69 (2000), and S. Journal, 10th Leg. at 695–96
(Wash. 1907).
24. S. Journal, 10th Leg. at 925–26 (Wash. 1907).
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to fully close Washington primaries and require party registration to
participate25 was overwhelmingly rejected by a 1922 referendum.26
Immediately after its enactment in 1907, the direct primary was
challenged based on several provisions of the state constitution relating
to legislative bills, and also on the ground that it interfered with election
freedom.27 The Washington State Supreme Court upheld the new
primary law.28 Justice Mark Fullerton’s opinion noted that the plaintiffs
had also objected that the direct primary tended to destroy political
parties; he observed that this was “a political, rather than a judicial,
question” and that appeal must be made to the people rather than to the
courts.29
In any event, the 1907 direct primary system lasted fewer than thirty
years. In 1935, in response to an initiative to the legislature championed
by labor unions and the state’s largest agricultural advocacy group, the
Washington State Grange,30 lawmakers enacted a “blanket primary”
mechanism.31 In the blanket primary, all candidates for a specific office,
25. Act of Mar. 19, 1921, ch. 177, 1921 Wash. Sess. Laws 692.
26. History of Referendum Measures, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS, https://www.sos.wa.gov/
elections/initiatives/statistics_referendummeasures.aspx [https://perma.cc/M5NJ-S2J3] (Referendum
Measure 14B); see also Todd Donovan, Elections in Washington, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE:
POLITICAL LIFE IN WASHINGTON, supra note 18, at 23, 24.
27. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 523, 97 P. 728, 732 (1908).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The “Granges of the Patrons of Husbandry” began in 1866 in the Midwest and spread
throughout the west as a nonpartisan advocacy group for farmers. DOROTHY O. JOHANSEN &
CHARLES M. GATES, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 346–48
(Dorothy O. Johansen ed., 2d ed. 1967). The Washington State Grange was organized in 1889. It
was a relatively conservative body self-consciously “composed of the very best people in our land,”
becoming a powerful political force both during the populist 1890s and the progressive era of the
early twentieth century. It focused much of its efforts on controlling railroads and large commercial
interests, and promoting good government, schools, and public services. The Grange also promoted
an income tax initiative that was approved overwhelmingly in the 1932 election, only to be
overturned by state supreme court rulings. HARRIET ANN CRAWFORD, THE WASHINGTON STATE
GRANGE, 1889–1924: A ROMANCE OF DEMOCRACY 14–17, 125–30, 137–43, 159–75 (1940); Harriet
Ann Crawford, Grange Attitudes in Washington, 1889–1896, 30 PAC. NW. Q. 243, 244–45 (1939);
Carlos A. Schwantes, Farmer-Labor Insurgency in Washington State: William Bouck, the Grange,
and the Western Progressive Farmers, 76 PAC. NW. Q. 2, 2 (1985); Hugh Spitzer, A Washington
State Income Tax—Again?, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 515, 527–28 (1993).
31. Act of Feb. 21, 1935, ch. 26, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 60; see also History of the Blanket
Primary in Washington, supra note 22. The measure, labeled Initiative No. 2, was filed with a
sufficient number of signatures on August 21, 1934, and enacted voluntarily by the legislature
February 21, 1935. Initiatives to the Legislature, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics_initleg.aspx [https://perma.cc/TCR4-H3JR].
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other than the President,32 were to be listed together with their party
affiliation indicated. The individual voter could mark his or her ballot for
any candidate—regardless of party—and the candidate from each party
receiving the highest number of votes would proceed to the general
election.33 Under this system, for example, if two Democrats each
received more primary votes than any Republican, only the top
Democrat would move on to the general election and face the highest
vote-getter among the Republicans.34
The blanket primary was progressive reform on steroids, touted as an
improvement for voter freedom of choice and allowing electors to
“vot[e] for the man.”35 But the “old-line party men and their
organizations” were concerned that supporters of one party would cross
over and vote in the opposing party’s primary to help select a weak
opponent.36 Party regulars challenged the blanket primary, but the
Washington State Supreme Court summarily upheld it in Anderson v.
Millikan.37 The Court ruled that the key issues had been determined by
the 1908 ruling sustaining the earlier direct primary law.38 It also
declared that political parties were neither mentioned nor favored by the
state constitution and that the blanket primary statute made no attempt to
32. The blanket primary statute amended several sections of the 1907 direct primary law, but left
in place Section 2 of the Act of Mar. 12, 1907, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457, 457, which
exempted the process of choosing presidential electors from the direct primary requirement. Act of
Feb. 21, 1935, ch. 26, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 60.
33. Ch. 26, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 60–64. Section 2 of that legislation established a single
primary election ballot with the names of all candidates, regardless of party, listed together. Voters
could vote for any of the candidates. The legislation left in place Section 18 of Act of Mar. 18,
1919, ch. 163, 1919 Wash. Sess. Laws 462, 473, and Section 24 of Act of Mar. 15, 1907, ch. 209,
1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457, 469; the net effect was that electors could vote for any candidate, but
only the highest vote-getter among the Republican candidates and the highest vote-getter among the
Democrats would proceed to the general election.
34. Id. This “hypothetical” is precisely what happened in 1996, when Democrat Gary Locke
received 287,762 votes (23.65%) to Democrat Norm Rice’s 212,888 (17.5%). Locke continued to
the general election to defeat Republican Ellen Craswell, who had received only 185,680 votes
(15.26%) in the primary. Election Search Results: 1996 Primary, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=16&c=&c2=&t=440&t2=
2&p=&p2=&y= [https://perma.cc/8HZ9-LKSJ].
35. Claudius O. Johnson, The Washington Blanket Primary, 33 PAC. NW. Q. 27, 28 (1942); see
also John Caldbick, Washington State Legislature Approves Grange-Sponsored Blanket Primary
Initiative
on
February
21,
1935,
HISTORYLINK
(Dec.
2,
2013),
http://www.historylink.org/File/10673 [https://perma.cc/75YZ-ZTPP].
36. Johnson, supra note 35; see also Claudius O. Johnson, Washington’s Blanket Primary
Reviewed, 48 PAC. NW. Q. 113, 113 (1957).
37. 186 Wash. 602, 608, 59 P.2d 295, 297–98 (1936).
38. Id. at 603, 59 P.2d at 296 (citing Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 523, 97 P. 728, 732 (1908));
see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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control the power of any political party to adopt its principles or control
its membership.39
Over the subsequent years, political life in Washington adjusted to the
blanket system. One political scientist reported that crossover voting was
modest, and the parties seem to have survived perfectly well.40
Nevertheless, party opposition to government interference in their
internal nominating processes continued, and the Democratic Party
launched a second attack in 1980 on First Amendment freedom-ofassociation grounds. In Heavey v. Chapman,41 the Washington State
Supreme Court again upheld the blanket primary, balancing the party’s
associational rights with the state’s interest in controlling and protecting
the integrity of the electoral process.42 The Heavey Court concluded that
the plaintiffs had not shown a substantial burden on their associational
rights and that compelling state interests to support a blanket primary
included voter interest in keeping party identification secret,
encouraging broad participation in the primary process, and giving each
voter a free choice among candidates.43
The federal constitutional tide finally turned in favor of the political
parties, which adopted a litigation strategy founded on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s gradual strengthening of First Amendment freedom of
association in the election context.44 In 1958, the Court relied on
freedom of association to strike down an Alabama law that effectively
barred the NAACP from operating in that state.45 Still earlier decisions
in the “White Primary” cases held that internal party regulations could
not operate to exclude African-Americans from participation in primary
elections.46 Later, in 1975, the Court held in Cousins v. Wigoda47 that
39. Anderson, 186 Wash. at 607–08, 59 P.2d at 297.
40. Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., The Blanket Primary and Party Regularity in Washington, 39 PAC. NW.
Q. 33, 34–35 (1948). Ogden’s conclusion is generally consistent with V.O. Key’s research,
published six years later. See supra note 10.
41. 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980).
42. Id. at 701–03, 611 P.2d at 1257–58.
43. Id. at 704–05, 611 P.2d at 1259.
44. John R. Labbé, Louisiana’s Blanket Primary After California Democratic Party v. Jones, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 721, 723–26 (2002).
45. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958).
46. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–64 (1944), held that extensive state involvement in the
process meant that political parties partook of a sufficient “public” character to require their primary
election candidate selection processes to be open to voters of all races. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, 469–70 (1953), extended the Allwright principles to encompass primary election processes that
allowed “private” racially exclusive political clubs to dictate the outcomes of party primary
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internal state Democratic Party rules, not a primary election state law,
would determine Illinois delegates to the party’s national convention.48
The Court’s opinion, by Justice William J. Brennan, stated that the
“National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally
protected right of political association” and that any “interference with
the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the
freedom of its adherents.”49 This position was reinforced six years later
in an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart that upheld the right of the
Wisconsin Democratic Party to insist that only voters affiliated with that
party participate in a primary to pick national party convention
delegates.50
In 1996, California voters copied Washington by adopting an
initiative measure that turned the state from a closed partisan primary to
the blanket primary method.51 Four parties challenged the new system:
the Democrats, the Republicans, the Libertarians, and the Peace and
Freedom Party.52 In California Democratic Party et al. v. Jones,53
writing for a seven-to-two majority, Justice Antonin Scalia restated the
principal that states may require parties to use primaries to select party
nominees.54 He then added, “in order to assure that intraparty
competition is resolved in a democratic fashion,” the First Amendment’s
freedom of association protects the ability of groups to limit membership
to those with whom they choose to work.55 He emphasized that “a
corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate.”56 Scalia’s
opinion concluded that political parties have a right to insist that
participation in their primaries be restricted to those who subscribe to
their aims.57 The Court held that the state’s expressed interests—
promoting fairness, protecting voter choice, increasing voter
elections. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55 (2001).
47. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
48. Id. at 487.
49. Id. at 487–88 (citations omitted).
50. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123–36 (1981).
51. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
52. Id. at 571.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 572. In discussing the legitimacy of state legislation requiring major parties to nominate
candidates through a primary process, Justice Scalia relied principally on American Party of Texas
v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974).
55. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571.
56. Id. at 574.
57. Id.
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participation, and protecting voter privacy—were not compelling under
the circumstances of that case.58 He then observed that even if those state
interests were compelling, they were not narrowly tailored because the
State of California could protect all of those interests “by resorting to a
nonpartisan blanket primary,” thereby forecasting the top two approach
that Washington eventually adopted.59
The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jones was consistent with
earlier decisions on the associational rights of political parties.60 Two
more decisions have been recently added to the cases described above.
First, in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,61
the Court held that a California statute dictating how political parties
were organized and how leaders were selected unconstitutionally
burdened their associational rights.62 Later, in Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut,63 a state Republican Party that chose to allow
independents to participate in that party’s primaries successfully
challenged a statute restricting primaries to registered party members.64
The Court held that the Republican Party’s associational rights under the
First Amendment allowed it to decide who could and could not
participate in its nominating processes.65
Less than a month after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jones in
June 2000, Washington’s Democrats, Republicans, and Libertarians
resumed their attack on the state’s blanket primary method in federal
court.66 The Washington Secretary of State, backed by the Grange,
defended the blanket primary, emphasizing various differences between
Washington’s and California’s statutes.67 The district court sided with
the state,68 but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
58. Id. at 584.
59. Id. at 585.
60. See notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
61. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
62. Id. at 230–31.
63. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
64. Id. at 212.
65. Id. at 214.
66. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Regarding the Washington
State Blanket Primary at 1, Democratic Party of Wash. State. v. Reed, No. C00-5419FDB, (W.D.
Wash. July 20, 2000), 2000 WL 35599898.
67. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1213 (2004) and 541 U.S. 957 (2004).
68. Democratic Party of Wash. State, 2002 WL 32925223, at *1.
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the differences between California’s and Washington’s blanket primaries
were legally insignificant.69 In his opinion, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld
wrote that the “Washington scheme denies party adherents the
opportunity to nominate their party’s candidate free of the risk of being
swamped by voters whose preference is for the other party” and further
wrote that the blanket primary “prevents those voters who share their
affiliation from selecting their party’s nominees.”70
The political parties’ long-term litigation strategy appeared to have
succeeded when this Ninth Circuit decision overturned Washington’s
nearly seventy-year blanket primary system. But the wide open, votefor-anyone primary was an approach to which voters had become
accustomed and liked.71 When legislators were faced with designing a
replacement in the 2004 session, they received strong pressure from the
general public and media to approve a substitute that retained primary
voters’ ability to vote for any candidates, regardless of those voters’
party affiliations.72 One political scientist suggests that Washington
voters continued to prefer a blanket-type primary “as a mechanism both
to reduce the power of the political parties and to encourage more
moderate, centrist candidates.”73 At the same time, party officials
expressed strong dislike for any system that allowed voters to cross party
lines in primaries.74 In response to voter preferences, some members of
the Washington House proposed a “top two” system, also known as the
“Louisiana” primary.75 In the top two system, now used in just four

69. Democratic Party of Wash. State, 343 F.3d at 1206–07.
70. Id. at 1204.
71. Background documents on the blanket primary, including historical materials and polling
data, are available at The Blanket Primary, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE: ELECTIONS,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/blanket_primary.aspx [https://perma.cc/3RUE-KWR6].
72. Editorial, Governor Should Sign New Primary into Law, EVERETT HERALD (Mar. 11, 2004,
9:00
PM),
https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/governor-should-sign-new-primary-into-law/
[https://perma.cc/4QEZ-QRJG]; see also Press Release, Wash. Sec’y of State, Polls Favor Modified
Blanket Primary (Jan. 28, 2004), https://www.sos.wa.gov/office/news-releases.aspx#/news/231
[https://perma.cc/3HEF-U67K].
73. Pirch, supra note 18, at 47.
74. Id. at 48.
75. The Louisiana blanket primary, first implemented in 1975, allows an elector to vote for any
candidate regardless of the voter’s party affiliation, with the two candidates receiving the largest
number of votes preceding to the general election. The Louisiana system was implemented because,
in 1975, an overwhelming percentage of that state’s voters were Democrats. The new system
provided more choice and offered a simplification of the previous mechanism, which was a threestep election process that itself had its origin in the overwhelmingly Democratic character of
Louisiana’s politics for many years. Labbé, supra note 44, at 742–44.
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states,76 the two candidates with the most votes proceed to the general
election regardless of political affiliation. But when the top two
approach was proposed in Washington’s legislature, partisan forces
threatened to derail it in court.77 During the legislative process, after the
House adopted a top two bill, Washington’s Senate amended the
legislation to add a back-up plan to take effect if a political party
challenge were successful.78 That alternative would install a primary
similar to the one adopted back in 1907. Dubbed the “pick-a-party”79 or
“Montana” primary,80 voters could pick the option of voting either in the
Democratic or the Republican primary but could not switch back-andforth on different races.
Washington’s Governor at the time, Gary Locke, who like many party
activists disliked the top two system, vetoed the sections of the
legislation that would have implemented that approach,81 leaving only
the pick-a-party primary.82 The Grange responded with its own lawsuit

76. The top two primary system, originating in Louisiana, is now used in California and
Washington as well, and in Nebraska only with respect to Nebraska’s non-partisan legislature. State
Primary Election Types, NAT’L CTR. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y7ALLD4R].
77. M. L. Madison, Area Party Leaders Criticize “Top Two” Primary Bill, TDN (Mar. 13, 2004),
https://tdn.com/business/local/area-party-leaders-criticize-top-two-primary-bill/article_7bdf76250c0c-5ef6-bb38-d40b7a8d504b.html [https://perma.cc/G55M-M4AT]; Neil Modie & Angela
Galloway, Locke Vetoes Election Plan: Voters now Face Separate Party Primaries this Fall,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 1, 2004, 9:00 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/local/a
rticle/Locke-vetoes-election-plan-1141277.php [https://perma.cc/28MY-RKMM].
78. Act of Apr. 1, 2004, ch. 271, 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 1172. Section 101 of the bill was a
transition section that would have substituted the “Montana” primary for the top two approach if a
court of competent jurisdiction held the top two version to be unconstitutional. Id. at 1202. See
Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 479–86, 105 P.3d 9, 12–15 (2005) for a
description of the circuitous route the legislation took in the state legislature.
79. For an example of use of the term “pick-a-party,” see A Timeline of Voting and Elections in
Washington State, WASH. SEC’Y OF ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/timeline/time5.htm
[https://perma.cc/59JX-8B6X].
80. The “Montana” approach was modeled on a system earlier implemented in that state. Wash.
State Grange, 153 Wash. 2d at 11–12, 105 P.3d at 478–79.
81. Washington’s constitution permits the governor to veto not only entire bills, but also
individual sections of legislation, or individual appropriation items in appropriations bills. WASH.
CONST. art. III, § 12.
82. Press Release, Office of Governor Gary Locke, Gov. Gary Locke Signs Bill Enacting
Montana
Primary
Election
System
(Apr.
1,
2004),
https://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov/governorlocke/press/press-view.asp?pressRelease=1575&news
Type=1 [https://perma.cc/LG86-M8YQ]. The text of Governor Locke’s veto message is available at
ch. 271, 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1241–43; see also Modie & Galloway, supra note 77.
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challenging the Governor’s veto, but in Washington State Grange v.
Locke,83 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the legislation as it
had emerged from the Governor’s cutting table.
The pick-a-party primary favored by the political parties was shortlived. It went into effect for the 2004 primary, but that year a solid
majority of the electorate indicated their dislike for the system.84 The
Grange roared back with Initiative No. 872, the “People’s Choice
Initiative of 2004” (“I-872”) which passed with nearly 60% of the vote.85
The initiative replaced the pick-a-party system with the top two
approach that Governor Locke had earlier vetoed. The political parties
promptly challenged the top two primary on familiar grounds, arguing
that it was indistinguishable from the blanket primary found in Jones to
violate their associational and free speech rights under the First
Amendment.86 The federal district court in 2005,87 and then the Ninth
Circuit in 2006,88 sided with the political parties. The Ninth Circuit
opinion held that because I-872 permitted candidates to identify
themselves as favoring one party or another, the measure “severely
burdens the Washington political parties’ associational rights.”89
Two years later, in Washington State Grange v. Washington State
Republican Party,90 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and upheld the I-872 top two system by a seven-to-two vote. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out that
unlike the blanket primary, I-872 did not choose party nominees—it
simply advanced the top two primary candidates to the general election
ballot even if both of them were in the same party.91 The Court also held
that the initiative did not impose a severe burden on the political parties’
associational rights and that the parties’ arguments rested “on factual
assumptions about voter confusion that can be evaluated only in the
83. 153 Wash. 2d 475, 105 P.3d 9 (2005).
84. See History of the Blanket Primary in Washington, supra note 22.
85. The initiative is entitled the People’s Choice Initiative. See The People’s Choice Initiative of
2004, ch. 2, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 9. For a breakdown of the 2004 election results, see OFFICE OF
THE SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT 9 (2004),
https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2004/Documents/200
4%20General%20Election/2004Leg-CongDistAbstract.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5NP-ECWJ].
86. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377
F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (No. CV05-0927-TSZ).
87. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907.
88. Wash. State Republican Party v. Washington, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2006).
89. Id. at 1124.
90. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
91. Id. at 453.
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context of an as-applied challenge.”92 The political parties continued to
battle away at the top two system, using the same litigation (with
shifting case names) to raise issues of voter confusion, associational
rights, compelled speech, and trademark claims, among others.93 These
arguments were eventually rejected by the Ninth Circuit in 2012,94
leaving the political parties precisely where they never wanted to be.
After successfully deploying a litigation strategy to gain both federal and
state court95 recognition of their private status and associational rights,
their attempt to eliminate the blanket primary ultimately forced them to
live with something worse: a primary election method that would
sometimes result in two general election candidates of the same party—
perhaps the other party.
But the future could hold additional unpleasant surprises for the
parties.
II.

THE POPULIST ERA AND PROHIBITED GIFTS OF PUBLIC
FUNDS

As described above, Washington State’s political parties fought the
1907 direct primary, then the blanket primary three decades later, and,
finally, the top two method. Notwithstanding the parties’ attempts to
maintain control over the selection of their own candidates, the
Progressive Era ideals of open government and direct voter participation
were reinforced and augmented with each iteration of Washington’s
92. Id. at 444.
93. The winding path of the litigation included, from the beginning, the following decisions:
Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 924–25 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (issuing
an initial preliminary injunction against implementation of a top two system on the grounds that it
unconstitutionally interfered with the political parties’ associational rights); Wash. State Republican
Party v. Washington, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s preliminary
injunction); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (reversing
the preliminary injunction and rejecting the facial challenge to the top two primary); Wash. State
Republican Party v. Wash., 545 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2008) (implementing the U.S. Supreme Court
decision); Wash. State Republican Party v. Grange, No. C05-0927-JCC, 2011 WL 92032 (W.D.
Wash. 2011) (granting summary judgment rejecting an as-applied challenge); Wash. State
Republican Party v. Grange, 676 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming and upholding the top two
system from the as-applied challenge).
94. Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange, 676 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 568 U.S. 814 (2012).
95. The Washington State Supreme Court underscored the private associational rights of political
parties in Pilloud v. King Cty. Republican Cent. Comm., 189 Wash. 2d 599, 404 P.3d 500, 502
(2017), where the court found that a statute requiring parties to elect rather than appoint legislative
district chairs violated the Republican Party’s freedom of association.
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nominating process. The good news for the parties is that after more than
a century of litigation efforts, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes them
as truly private associations with the right to be substantially free from
government interference. The bad news for the parties is that voters have
remained so keen on “voting for the candidate” rather than voting for a
party that, in Washington, primaries have partially transformed into nonpartisan affairs.
But things could get still worse for the Washington’s political parties,
because of a provision in the state constitution rooted in populism, the
movement that immediately preceded and influenced progressivism.
Populist ideas permeate the Washington State Constitution.96 A
majority of the delegates to the state’s 1889 constitutional convention
had a populist outlook, regardless of political party.97 They were
suspicious of railroads, banks, and commercial interests generally;
supportive of farmers and working people; and they strongly favored
constitutional restrictions on government handouts to the private
sector.98 These attitudes were typical of Washington’s predominantly
agricultural residents in the late nineteenth century and led to the success
of the People’s Party (also known as the “Populist Party”) in
Washington’s 1896 election.99 In fact, one of the most active
organizations in Washington politics during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was the Washington State Grange,100 the same
farmers’ group that spearheaded the blanket primary in 1935.101
Among the key anti-corporate provisions of Washington’s 1889
constitution were three sections banning state and local government
gifts, loans, and credit support to the private sector—article VIII,
sections 5 and 7, and article XII, section 9.102 Although worded
differently,103 all three constitutional sections were propelled by anti96. See generally Hugh Spitzer, Washington: The Past and Present Populist State, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 771 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons
eds., 2008).
97. Id. at 773.
98. Id. at 774–76.
99. Id. at 774.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
102. James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corporations in Washington: 100 Years of
Judicial Decisions—Have the Framers’ Views Been Followed?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163,
168–69, 182–85 (1989).
103. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 states: “The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given
or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.” WASH. CONST.
art. VIII, § 7 provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or
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railroad sentiment104 and they have been interpreted and applied
identically.105 Of particular relevance here is the flat prohibition on gifts
of public funds.
The source of the anti-gift provision was a desire to firmly separate
the public and private sectors and to prevent business misuse of taxpayer
dollars.106 But early in the state’s history, the Washington State Supreme
Court declined to restrict the clause’s application to transfers of public
funds to for-profit enterprises, holding that a county’s cash donation to a
private nonprofit fair association to operate a county fair violated the ban
on gifts to private organizations, except in aid of the poor and infirm. 107
As a result, the governmental arrangement with fair associations was
reconfigured by statute so that counties could “employ persons to assist
in the management of such fairs,” thus enabling them to contract with
the private parties and pay them in exchange for specific services.108
Over the years, the Washington State Supreme Court elaborated on what
characterizes an unconstitutional gift, defining it as a “voluntary transfer
of property without consideration,”109 and then as “a transfer of property
without consideration and with donative intent.”110 At the same time,
“[r]eceipt of valuable consideration assures that a transaction is not a

property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or
indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 states: “The state shall not in any manner loan its credit, nor shall it
subscribe to, or be interested in the stock of any company, association or corporation.”
104. Dolliver, supra note 102, at 184–85.
105. Citizens for Clean Air v. Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 40, 785 P.2d 447, 458 n.8, (1990);
Wash. Health Care Facilities v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115–116, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980).
106. See ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 162–
63 (G. Alan Tar ed., 2d ed. 2013); Dolliver, supra note 102, at 190.
107. Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141 P. 892, 893 (1914).
108. Act of Jan. 8, 1917, ch. 32, 1917 Wash. Laws 103. Interestingly, House Bill 97, the 1917
legislation permitting counties to employ persons to assist in county fair management, was referred
to the House Committee on Agriculture but was then re-referred to the Committee on Judiciary,
which later reported it back to the full House “with the recommendation that it is, in our opinion,
constitutional.” H. Journal, 15th Sess., 180 (Wash. 1917). This suggests some initial uncertainty
about the effectiveness of the statutory “fix” for the 1914 ruling in Johns.
109. State ex rel. O’Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 804, 399 P.2d 623, 625–26
(1965).
110. Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d 977, 981 (1980).
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gift.”111 The Washington State Supreme Court has been fairly deferential
to elected officials’ determinations of adequacy of consideration.112
Further, a transaction is not deemed a gift if the transfer of public
money, property, or services is an incidental effect of government
carrying out one of its fundamental purposes or public functions. For
example, in Johnson v. Johnson,113 the Washington State Supreme Court
held that spending government funds to collect child support from a
delinquent parent carries out the recognized public function of protecting
children.114 But that function or purpose must be “fundamental,”115 and it
is not deemed adequate consideration simply because a transfer of public
assets or credit is seen as generally useful or might have future public
benefits.116 The potential problems are accentuated when there is an
identifiable private recipient of an expenditure of public funds, as
opposed to the public at large.117 Early in the state’s history, the
Washington State Supreme Court held that a county’s donation to a
private nonprofit association to operate a fair violated the state
constitution’s ban on gifts of public funds. In Johns v. Wadsworth,118 the
Court stated: “[t]hat agricultural fairs serve a good purpose is not
questioned, but the Constitution makes no distinction between purposes,
but directly and unequivocally prohibits all gifts of money, property, or
credit to, or in aid of any corporation,” except to aid the poor and
infirm.119 A concurring opinion added: “[t]he grant in question is of
obvious public benefit. The terms of the quoted provision of the
Constitution are, however, so clear and explicit as to leave no room for
construction.”120 While the Court has subsequently approved various
government transfers to private persons in exchange for sufficient
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., King County v. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d 584, 597–601, 949 P.2d
1260, 1267–68 (1997) (holding a professional baseball team’s minimal annual rent payment to a
public authority did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of the use of a ballpark because those
payments were accompanied by a substantial array of other forms of consideration).
113. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
114. Id. at 267–68, 634 P.2d at 884.
115. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d at 624, 949 P.2d at 1280.
116. Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 812–13, 576 P.2d 54, 59 (1978).
117. Compare id. (city had unconstitutionally provided credit support by purchasing property to
re-sell to a specific private developer), with United States v. Town of North Bonneville, 94 Wash.
2d 827, 830–37, 621 P.2d 127, 129–32 (1980), (municipality purchased a tract of land in order to
make it available to its residents, generally, who were being flooded out and displaced by a new
reservoir).
118. 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914).
119. Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141 P. 892, 893 (1914).
120. Id. at 357, 141 P. at 894.
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consideration,121 the basic prohibition on uncompensated transfers of
public money and assets remains solidly in place.122
III. ARE PUBLICLY FUNDED ELECTIONS OF PARTY
OFFICIALS AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES
UNCONSTITUTIONAL GIFTS IN WASHINGTON STATE?
This Part now applies the Washington State Constitution’s ban on
public gifts to private persons to two specific uses of public funds and
processes: first, to elect political party precinct offers, and second, to
select presidential candidates for the major political parties.
In Jones,123 the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that political parties, as
private associations, have the right to determine who can and cannot
vote in their candidate selection processes; states may not interfere with
internal party functions without a compelling state interest.124 This was
reiterated in the Ninth Circuit’s decision to overturn Washington State’s
blanket primary125 and further reinforced by the federal district court’s
opinion in Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State
Grange,126 which upheld the I-872 top two primary. But Washington
State Grange separately held that the application of the top two approach

121. See, e.g., King County v. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997)
(finding below-market rent of baseball stadium acceptable because of other sufficient
consideration); Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978)
(holding provision of water to private manufacturer at below-market rates permitted because of a
contractual bargain was adequate consideration); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 2d 545, 108
P.2d 348 (1940) (finding payment of pension amounts not a gift, but compensation for prior
services).
122. For examples of the continued vitality of the prohibition of gifts of public funds, see
Authority of Rural County to Use Special Sales Tax Revenues to Pay for Installation of Fiber Optic
Cable for Privately-Owned Electrical Utility, AGO 2002 No. 1 (Mar. 18, 2002),
https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/authority-rural-county-use-special-sales-tax-revenues-payinstallation-fiber-optic [https://perma.cc/2638-MMC6] (concluding that as a private entity nonprofit
electrical cooperative cannot receive tax money from government to fund equipment for installation
of fiber optic cable); State ex rel. O’Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 803–07, 399 P.2d
623, 625–27 (1965) (finding that expenditures of public funds for the entertainment of shippers,
business people, and other private individuals constitute unconstitutional gifts).
123. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
124. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
126. No. C05-0927-JCC, 2011 WL 92032 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d, 676 F.3d 784 (9th Cir.
2012). The political party plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s ruling on the PCO issue.
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to party offices such as precinct committee officers (“PCOs”)127 violated
the right of parties to control their internal affairs. In his opinion,
U.S. District Court Judge John C. Coughenour cited the rulings in Eu
and Tashjian, emphasizing that “voters in the partisan ‘party preference’
races are selecting individuals to serve as members of a government
office; voters in the PCO races, on the other hand, are selecting
individuals to serve as members of the political parties. This distinction
is critical.”128 Judge Coughenour also relied on Arizona Libertarian
Party, Inc. v. Bayless,129 where the Ninth Circuit held that allowing
nonmembers to vote for party precinct committee-people violated the
Libertarian Party’s associational rights.130
After Judge Coughenour’s ruling barred use of the top two system for
precinct committee officers in Washington State, the political parties
worked with legislators to redesign the PCO-selection system so it
would pass constitutional muster. In 2012, the Washington legislature
enacted statutory amendments with the express intent “to remedy the
unconstitutional method of selecting precinct committee officers by
implementing a provision requiring voters to affirm an affiliation with
the appropriate party in order to vote in a race for precinct committee
officer in that party.”131 As the bill worked its way through the
legislature, testimony from opponents (including the Grange) observed
that political parties are private, that PCOs are not public officers, and
that taxpayers should not be required to pay the cost of PCO elections.132
The legislation declared that “the office of precinct committee officer
itself is both a constitutionally recognized and authorized office with
certain duties outlined in state law and the state Constitution.”133
However, this declaration is without foundation in the text of the state
constitution. While the Washington State Constitution mentions
127. Precinct committee officers are the lowest officials positions within the major parties. In
Washington, as in many states, PCOs are responsible for connecting with individual voters on the
precinct level, distributing campaign literature, and getting out the vote on election day. PCOs also
participate in choosing higher level party officials and convention delegates. Become a Precinct
Committee Officer, WASH. ST. DEMOCRATS, https://www.wa-democrats.org/local/pco
[https://perma.cc/UH8S-M429]; Lane Covington, Become a Republican Precinct Committee Officer
Today!, KING COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY (May 10, 2018), https://www.kcgop.org/blog/becomea-republican-precinct-committee-officer-today/ [https://perma.cc/T8J4-AB39].
128. Wash. State Republican Party, 2011 WL 92032, at *9.
129. 351 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2003).
130. Ariz. Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Bayless, 351 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2003).
131. Act of June 7, 2012, ch. 89, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 682.
132. H.B. Rep. E3SHB 1860, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. at 3 (Wash. 2012); S.B. Rep. E3SHB 1860,
62d Leg., Reg. Sess. at 3 (Wash. 2012).
133. Act of June 7, 2012, ch. 89, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 682.
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precincts or precinct “officers” in six sections, none of those provisions
outline duties, and all but one appear to refer to precinct level public
positions such as election officials; the single reference to PCOs clearly
distinguishes those party positions from true public offices.134 The point
is that there is scant constitutional support for the notion that PCOs are
public officials of any kind. They are ground-level party officials, and
rulings such as Judge Coughenour’s in Washington State Republican
Party v. Washington State Grange and the Ninth Circuit’s in Bayless
reinforce the understanding of PCOs as officers of non-governmental
private associations.135
The independent, non-governmental character of political parties and
their officers was underscored by the Washington State Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Pilloud v. King County Republican Central
Committee,136 which overturned a statute requiring parties to elect rather
than appoint legislative district chairs. Pilloud was decided on the
grounds that internal operations are a political party’s own business and
that the statute violated the Republican Party’s freedom of association.137
Chief Justice Mary Fairhurst’s opinion further held that there was no
compelling state interest for the government’s interference in internal
party governance.138 The Washington State Supreme Court’s recognition
of the fundamentally private character of political parties might be a
victory for the First Amendment associational rights of parties, but it
also has state constitutional implications for Washington laws that result
in the expenditure of public money on the internal proceedings of those
private political groups.

134. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 34 refers to the recall of public officers at the precinct level; WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 6 mentions the filling of vacancies in public office at the precinct level; WASH.
CONST. art. VI, § 1 refers to voter residency within a precinct; WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5 mentions
county officers at the precinct level; WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, § 14 states that public officials at
the precinct level, among others in office upon statehood, are to serve until their successors are
qualified. Only WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(3) expressly refers to precinct committee officers, and
that reference is to allow PCOs to serve on the state redistricting commission; in other words, PCOs
are expressly distinguished from officials in public office. It should be noted that political parties
are mentioned in WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15, which requires that when vacancies occur in partisan
elective offices, those offices must be filled by appointment from a three-person list nominated by
the relevant county central committee of the departed office holder’s political party.
135. See supra notes 124, 127 and accompanying text.
136. 189 Wash. 2d 599, 603–04, 404 P.3d 500, 502 (2017).
137. Id. at 604–06, 404 P.3d at 502–03.
138. Id. at 606, 404 P.3d at 503.
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Notwithstanding the judicial recognition of political parties as private
organizations, Washington statutes—particularly the statute passed with
party support in 2012139—continue to treat parties as quasi-public, and
PCOs as some type of government officers. For example, state law
mandates that PCOs be registered voters,140 elected at primary elections
in even-number years141 to serve two-year terms.142 Another statute
provides that county central committees of political parties consist of
those elected PCOs.143 It is hard to imagine that these provisions would
survive a challenge along the lines of Pilloud. For example, what if the
Democratic Party of Washington were to change its bylaws to provide
that its county central committees must consist of members elected by
precinct-level Democratic clubs, that resident non-citizens were entitled
to join those clubs and serve as PCOs, and that PCO terms would last
four years? If Washington courts remained consistent with Pilloud, it is
probable that they would sustain the authority of the Democratic Party to
control its internal organization however it pleased—notwithstanding the
PCO statutes.
The flipside of the federal and state cases on political party
independence is that to the extent that those private organizations
continue to make use of biennial public primary elections to choose their
officers—without paying for county-level election costs—the counties
could readily be viewed as spending public money for private purposes.
This is the logical extension of a case like Johns,144 which barred
transferring public money to a county fair association without
consideration. This potential problem could be remedied by legislation
providing that political parties can contract to pay an allocable share of
primary election costs in return for access to the ballot. But without such
an adjustment, a successful constitutional challenge is still possible.
That raises the issue of the presidential preference primary in
Washington State. That primary is a curious beast. Historically, the
state’s political parties formed their national convention delegations
purely through caucus and district convention processes.145 The 1907
direct primary law exempted presidential primaries,146 and this was not
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Act of June 7, 2012, ch. 89, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 682.
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.80.041 (2018).
Id. § 29A.52.171.
Id. § 29A.80.051.
Id. § 29A.80.030.
See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
See Pirche, supra note 18, at 52–53.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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changed by the 1935 blanket primary initiative.147 Then, in response to a
1988 initiative to the legislature declaring that the party caucus system
was “unnecessarily restrictive of voter participation,”148 the legislature
created a presidential preference primary in 1989. That measure required
that the results of a presidential primary determine the allocation of
delegate positions among presidential candidates.149 It also required that
all costs of presidential primaries be provided by the state rather than at
the local level.150 In 1995, the legislature made it optional for parties to
use the primary results to allocate their delegates,151 attempting to
address the conflict between internal party rules and the interest in
conducting a presidential primary.152 But Washington State’s political
parties have preferred caucuses and have been reluctant to award many
delegates based on presidential primary results.153 Because the parties
planned to entirely ignore the 2004 presidential primary results, the 2003
legislature cancelled the 2004 preferential primary—a venture that
would have cost six million dollars with no appreciable impact.154
Washington’s current presidential preference primary statute continues
to allow the parties to either use, or ignore, preferential primary
results.155 It was suspended again in 2012 to save money after the parties
decided to rely on their caucuses to allocate delegates.156 In 2016,
Republicans used it to allocate some of their convention delegates while
Democrats ignored it entirely.157 That proceeding cost Washington State

147. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
148. Act of July 23, 1989, ch. 4, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 23. Initiative to the Legislature No. 99 was
filed in 1988 with 202,872 signatures. Rather than going to the voters, the Legislature enacted it on
March 31, 1989, as ch. 4, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 23. See Initiatives to the Legislature, supra note 31.
149. Act of July 23, 1989, ch. 4, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 23.
150. Id.
151. Act of Apr. 23, 1995, ch. 20, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 2519.
152. S.B. Rep. ESB 5852, 54th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. at 2–3 (Wash. 1995). The 1995 legislation
was also intended to provide flexibility in conforming Washington State’s presidential primary with
national party scheduling rules. Id.
153. Donovan, supra note 26, at 28.
154. H.B. Rep. HB 2297, 58th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. at 2 (Wash. 2003).
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.050 (2018).
156. See Act of May 12, 2011, ch. 319, sec. 1(5), 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 2064; Washington State
Cancels 2012 Presidential Primary, SEATTLE TIMES (May 12, 2011, 5:59 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-cancels-2012-presidential-primary/
[https://perma.cc/KX5P-U2KE].
157. Donovan, supra note 26, at 28. Donovan points out the interesting fact that Hillary Clinton
won a majority of the Democratic preferential primary votes, but activists attending party caucuses
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in excess of $ 8.4 million.158 For the 2020 presidential nominating
process, both parties opted to use the state-sponsored presidential
preference primary to choose their respective convention delegates.159
Does the Washington presidential primary procedure violate the
state’s constitutional ban on gifts of public funds to benefit private
entities? That is a closer question than the PCO issue. Every four years
the state seems to sponsor an event and invite “guests” (the major
political parties). But those guests are not required to attend the
celebration and have exhibited lackluster interest in doing so. Therefore,
it is more difficult to establish that the parties truly benefit from the
preferential primaries. They are perhaps like the children in the Johnson
child support case, i.e., indirect beneficiaries of what is a “recognized
public function” that they can choose to attend (or not).160 The
counterargument is that under the relevant statute, the political parties
play a substantial role in setting the presidential primary date161 and can
direct some of the secretary of state’s rulemaking for those elections.162
Moreover, if the parties were to consistently participate in and actively
exercise control over the preferential primaries, a successful state
constitutional challenge might be mounted, based on the gift-of-publicfunds theory.163

had already determined that a majority of Washington’s Democratic delegation would be pledged to
Bernie Sanders.
158. E-mail from Erich R. Ebel, Commc’ns Dir., Office of Wash. Sec’y of State, to Hugh D.
Spitzer, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law (June 27, 2018, 8:33 AM)
[https://perma.cc/DT5V-ZPJR].
159. David Gutman, Washington Democrats Choose Presidential Primary for 2020, Ditching
Precinct
Caucuses,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2019,
11:34
AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-democrats-choose-presidentialprimary-for-2020-ditching-caucuses/ [https://perma.cc/54HK-2PTJ].
160. Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 264, 634 P.2d 877, 882 (1981); see supra notes 113–
114 and accompanying text.
161. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.020 (2018).
162. Id. § 29A.56.050.
163. Another challenge might be mounted against the major parties’ use of the presidential
primary for their private purposes based on article I, section 12 of the Washington State
Constitution, which provides that no statute may grant privileges or immunities to any class of
citizens or corporations “which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or
corporations.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. The argument might be that because WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 29A.56.010–.060 together with §§ 29A.56.610–.620 provide state-funded access to the “major
parties” but not “minor parties,” the smaller and new parties are harmed by the privilege and state
funding handed to the established private political groups. “Major parties” are those receiving at
least 5% of the votes in the prior presidential election. Id. § 29A.04.086.
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IV. LITIGATING IN A LAND OF CONFLICTING PROVISIONS
FROM DIFFERENT HISTORICAL MOVEMENTS
What is to be made of the major parties’ stubborn misunderstanding
of the voters they had worked so hard to attract, and their use of tactics
that backfired so decidedly? Back in 2000, when Washington State’s
political parties relaunched their legal attack on the blanket primary after
Jones, they were reacting to a U.S. Supreme Court opinion that was
based on America’s First Amendment clause protecting speech and
association.164 At first, in 2003, the parties seem to have succeeded,
overturning the blanket primary in Democratic Party v. Reed.165
But the political parties might not have taken into sufficient account
the political and constitutional resiliency of statutes and constitutional
provisions embedded in Washington law by two intervening
movements: populism and progressivism. Both of those movements
were skeptical of politicians and the established political parties,166 as
well as business interests.167 The progressives undertook a concerted
effort to diminish the importance of parties and to force the parties to
open their processes to the public. Those efforts included the 1907 direct
primary law, which was popular among voters. In 1922, the electorate
rejected closed primaries where they would have to register by party.168
They similarly embraced the Grange-sponsored blanket primary in
1935.169
Political scientists have observed that political culture can be “path
dependent,” meaning that practices remain stable over time “even
though the forces that shaped them initially may have dissipated.”170 But

164. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
165. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003); see supra notes
66–70 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. An 1894 cartoon asks: “In Which Box Shall the
Voter of ‘96 Put His Ballot?” The three choices presented are: “Republican Party, Builders of
Corporate Wealth,” “Democratic Party, Builders of Saloons and Jails,” and “People’s Party,
Builders of Churches and Schools.” In Which Box Will the Voter of ‘96 Put His Ballot?, Kingfisher
Reformer (Nov. 29, 1894), http://courses.missouristate.edu/bobmiller/Populism/scartoon
/scartoon33.htm [https://perma.cc/6XQD-U2A2].
167. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
170. Nicolas P. Lovrich Jr., John C. Pierce & H. Stuart Elway, Two Washingtons? Political
Culture in the Evergreen State, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: POLITICAL LIFE IN
WASHINGTON, supra note 18, at 1, 2.

10 - Spitzer.docx (Do Not Delete)

848

5/30/2019 10:49 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:823

in this instance, Washington voter commitment to wide-open election
practices has not dissipated at all. The state’s open government attitude
can be traced to its populist constitution, later accelerated by
progressivism.171 Political customs (including the initiative, referendum,
and recall, for example172) are often entrenched in constitutions or
statutes by an active political movement. Those provisions then play a
key role in reinforcing and continuing that movement as an ongoing part
of a state’s political life. This has been described by Professor Robert A.
Schapiro, who has cogently shown how electoral supermajorities
enshrine their values in state constitutional provisions and then those
provisions themselves help generate ongoing political customs and
community.173 Professor Nicholas P. Lovrich recently elaborated on how
entrenched political values continue from one generation to the next:
“An area’s political culture tends to be learned by newcomers and
sustained by long-time residents, and thereby comes to have an ongoing
impact on politics and policy.”174
Washington’s open approach to primaries has had remarkable staying
power because, decade after decade, voters insist on maintaining an
election system that enables them to vote for pretty much whomever
they want, whatever they want, whenever they want. This attitude,
founded in populism and progressivism, is also reflected in the state’s
resilient initiative and referendum process,175 as well as voter insistence
on electing judges.176 In Washington, the open government political
culture seems to have only gained strength over the years. When the
political parties embarked on a successful legal strategy to eliminate the
blanket primary and replace it in 2004 with one that required primary
voters to opt for one party or the other,177 the state’s popular political
culture recoiled on the parties, throwing out both the baby and the
bathwater, putting the top two system in place.178 The bottom line is that
171. See supra notes 6–16 and 94–98 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
173. Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV.
389, 393 (1998).
174. Lovrich et al., supra note 170, at 2.
175. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, Max Neiman & Johnny Peel, Institutional Threat and
Partisan Outcomes: Legislative Candidates’ Attitudes Toward Direct Democracy, 1 STATE POL. &
POL’Y Q. 364, 370 (2001).
176. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Janine Parry, Public Reasoning About Judicial Selection
Methods 20 (paper presented at the Westerm Political Science Association meeting in Vancouver,
B.C., 2009).
177. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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litigation approaches to solving political problems have limitations.179
With a strong enough political culture and strong enough tools in the
hands of voters, the public can sometimes reverse what initially appears
to be a “win” in the courts—even a win based on the First Amendment
of the Federal Constitution.
The political parties’ failure to foresee the ultimate political outcome
of their litigation strategy for primary elections was in part because the
party activists’ worldview was different from that of the voters at large.
In a thoughtful analysis, Professors Nathaniel Persily and Bruce E. Cain
have observed some contradictions among court decisions on the role of
American political parties in the election process—contradictions that
reflect a half dozen competing and very different paradigms. 180 These
include, among others, a long-dominant “managerial” paradigm in which
“states had near plenary authority to regulate political parties” for the
preservation of political order,181 a “libertarian” approach that viewed
parties as private interest groups to “be accorded maximal rights of
association,”182 and the early twentieth century “progressive paradigm”
that viewed parties as impeding democracy and the supremacy of the
electorate.183 Washington State political party activists probably leaned
toward yet another of Persily’s and Cain’s paradigms: a “pluralist” view
emphasizing group-based competition built into two major parties that
serve as coalitions of interest groups.184 That approach protects the role
of parties as private, but indispensable, mediating institutions in
American politics.185 Yet the party officials driving the litigation strategy
hopped on board the “libertarian” trend of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent freedom-of-association decisions as a tactic to gain freedom from
state interference in the nominating processes.
What the party activists missed was that Washington State voters
remained ensconced in the Progressive Era. The electorate was
179. For a general discussion of the limitation of litigation strategies in carrying out political and
social goals, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
180. Persily & Cain, supra note 7, at 779.
181. Id. at 779–82.
182. Id. at 782–85.
183. Id. at 785–87.
184. Id. at 793–94. Obviously, the Libertarian Party, which was active in some of the Washington
cases discussed above, would have had Persily’s and Cain’s “libertarian” worldview rather than
viewing the political world through a lens that focused just on two major parties.
185. Id. at 779, 791–96.
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overwhelmingly wedded to a progressive paradigm and had no interest
in changing. The various lawsuits,186 the shifting primary election
methods,187 and the ultimate decision by voters to throw the partisan
baby out of the primary bathwater,188 shows that in a democracy a
significant disconnect between political leadership and the voters at
large will eventually result in what the voters want.
Another important conclusion is that political leaders, including party
leadership, must be mindful of state constitutions. Just as the late
eighteenth century drafters of the Bill of Rights wrote in strong
protections for speech and association, the populist drafters of
Washington’s state constitution—people who took the Bill of Rights for
granted but had other immediate concerns—built in very different types
of provisions a century later. Those state provisions were meant to
protect the public and the public purse from exploitation by business
interests. Entrenched provisions can come back and bite. In this instance,
it is conceivable that article VIII, sections 5 and 7, which ban spending
public money for private sector purposes, could be the legal basis for
eliminating the use of taxpayer-funded primaries for electing PCOs, who
are private political party officers. It is also conceivable—though less
likely—that Washington courts could find the preferential presidential
primary violates the state’s ban on gifting public funds.
* * *
When political actors access the courts for strategic purposes, they
can get caught in unforeseen twists and turns of politics, including
different policy choices embraced by society at different points in
history and then entrenched into statutes and constitutions. This does not
at all mean that citizens and organized groups should avoid using the
judicial system to further legitimate goals. However, political insiders in
a democracy must plan their tactical moves—including use of
litigation—with an eye towards the much broader political context and
broad public desires. Otherwise, they risk having things turn out quite
different from what they had intended.

186. See notes 66–95 and accompanying text.
187. See notes 72–83 and accompanying text.
188. See notes 84–85 and accompanying text.

